Response of the Financial Markets to the European Central Bank’s Policy Announcements during the Subprime and Global Financial Crisis by Ayoki, Milton
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Response of the Financial Markets to the
European Central Bank’s Policy
Announcements during the Subprime
and Global Financial Crisis
Milton Ayoki
Institute of Policy Research and Analysis
December 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78846/
MPRA Paper No. 78846, posted 2 May 2017 11:49 UTC
  
 
Response of the Financial Markets to the 
European Central Bank’s Policy 
Announcements during the Subprime  
and Global Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milton Ayoki 
Institute of Policy Research and Analysis 
Kampala 
 
 
 
 
December 31, 2010 
 1 
© 2010 by Milton Ayoki. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © 
notice, is given to the source. 
 
 
Response of the Financial Markets to the European Central Bank’s Policy 
Announcements during the Subprime and Global Financial Crisis 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper surveys evidence of the impact of macroeconomic and financial sector policy 
announcements in the euro area during the recent crisis on interbank credit and liquidity 
risk premia. Evidence suggests that interest rates cuts, fiscal stimulus and recapitalization 
measures were effective in calming the distressed financial markets as measured by 
reduction of the Libor–OIS spread. However, decisions not to reduce interest rates as well 
as ad hoc bank bailouts widened the Libor–OIS spread thus increased stress in the financial 
markets. Liquidity support announcements were initially effective, as measured by the 
reduction in the Libor-OIS spread, but lost significance as the crisis worsened. Both 
announcements of capital injections and guarantees on bank liabilities were effective in 
reducing credit risk in the euro area. The results of the event study further illustrate that the 
short-term impact of interventions depended on the particular circumstances that prevailed 
during each phase of the crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
The ability to enhance the predictability of monetary policy is hailed as one of the 
fundamental benefits of increased central banks policy announcements in recent years. To 
this end, many central banks, including the European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, 
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the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve announce their monetary policy decisions on 
regular basis. Through post-meeting press conferences, and press releases, speeches, 
expanded testimony before the legislature, release of the minutes of policy meetings, and 
the regular publication of reports on monetary policy and the economy, many central banks 
are said to have succeeded in signaling their future policy intentions to the public in a more 
explicit way (Bernanke, 2004; Weber, 2008; Ehrmann and Fratzcher, 2005; Poole 2005.   
Yet despite the plethora of studies that relate movement of asset prices and changes 
in interbank risk premia with macroeconomic and financial sector policy announcements, 
the impact induced by specific types of policy announcements did not generate much 
interest, until the recent crisis. How for instance, did anyone expect the market to respond 
to announcements of interest rate cuts by ECB or recapitalization measures by U.S during 
the global crisis? Experiences with unprecedented market interventions announced and 
undertaken by the authorities of major advanced economies during the financial crisis will 
continue to offer valuable lessons in the conduct of monetary policy.  
This essay reviews evidence on the response of the financial markets to the specific 
policy measures that were announced by the European Central Bank during the subprime 
and global financial crisis. Whenever possible, such responses in the euro area are 
compared with those (for similar events) in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
While most evidence from recent studies has focused on the US, a number of contributions 
also provide evidence for the euro area, e.g. IMF (2009) and Ait-Sahalia et al (2010) 
provide interesting analysis of the impact of macroeconomic and financial sector policy 
announcements by authorities of major advanced economies (including the euro area) on 
interbank credit and liquidity premia. They helpfully distinguish the effects of the 
announcement by policy category, namely, interest rate decisions; quantitative and credit 
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easing as well as liquidity support; recapitalization; fiscal stimulus packages or asset 
purchases, liquidity guarantees; deposit insurance; and bail outs of individual banks.   
 Their analysis also distinguishes between two phases of the crisis: the subprime 
crisis, which began on June 1, 2007 to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 
14, 2008, and the global crisis that began from September 15, 2008 to March 31, 2009. 
This makes it possible to discern the effectiveness of policy initiatives in the two scenarios. 
Against heightened uncertainty about financial and macroeconomic prospects, the United 
States, United Kingdom and euro area among other advanced economies initiated a wide-
ranging policy measures during the subprime crisis, announcing interest rate cuts, and 
continue to announce major policy measures during the global financial crisis – as the need 
to restore financial stability and avoid global economic depression became urgent. In the 
United States, the recapitalization measures, fiscal stimulus and bail outs, fiscal easing and 
liability guarantee were frequently announced.  
The United Kingdom, on her part, announced initiative to provide liquidity support, 
forex swaps and liquidity guarantees. During the global financial crisis, the UK continued 
to announce its interest rate cuts as well as liquidity support, financial restructuring 
measures (recapitalization), bail out (asset purchases), liquidity guarantees and quantitative 
easing. In euro area, the European Central Bank announced interest rate cuts and decisions 
to keep interest rate stable at other times. ECB further announced measures to provide 
fiscal easing, bank bail outs, recapitalization and liquidity guarantee targeted at selected 
central banks. Figure 1 shows the accumulative set of interventions that were announced 
for a sample of major advanced economies.  
The effects of policy announcements are measured in many ways. Both the IMF 
(2009) and Ait-Sahalia et al (2010)’s studies measure the effects on policy announcements 
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on the day-to-day changes in the 3-month U.S. dollar Libor–OIS spread1 — a proxy for the 
liquidity and counterparty risk premia in the global interbank markets. The Libor–OIS 
spread is widely accepted as an indicator of financial distress (Taylor, 2009) and a valuable 
measure of the effectiveness of policy interventions (McCormick, 2007). A positive Libor–
OIS spread indicates that the market is under stress. Discussions in section four are 
primarily based on effects of policy announcements on the Libor–OIS spreads.  
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief overview 
of the theoretical arguments underpinning announcements and expectation formation, how 
policy signals can influence behavour of market agents. Section three highlights the 
methodological approaches used in recent announcement studies while section four 
discusses the empirical evidence and section five concludes.   
2 An overview of theoretical literature on announcement effects  
Based on standard theories of market expectation formation, effects of central bank signals 
on expectations of future monetary policy decisions (e.g. interest rate) are defined by: 
ttttt
e
t usrRyHr  ),...,,,(11  
or 
tttttj
e
jt usrRyHr  ),...,,,(         (1)  
where tr is current overnight rate and 
e
tr 1  is today’s expectation of tomorrow’s overnight 
rate, while ts is a vector of central bank signals, e.g., announcing a numerical inflation 
                                                 
1 The spread between the London Inter–Bank Offered Rates (Libor) and Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) for 
the U.S. dollar.  The Libor serves as the main instrument for benchmarking short-term rates and is used as the 
basis for settlement of interest rate contracts on many of the world’s major futures and option exchanges (see 
www.bbalibor.com for details). The OIS rate is a measure of the expected risk-free interest rate over specific 
terms of secured transactions.   
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target.2  Intuitively, central bank announcement ( ts ) influence expectations of future short-
term rates ( e jtr  ), which, in turn, influence long-term rates and other financial-market 
prices (Rt). These prices, in turn, influence such macro variables as inflation and output 
( t  and ty ).  
As noted by Woodford (2001: pp. 307 and 312), successful monetary policy is not 
so much a matter of effective control of overnight interest rates as of affecting the 
evolution of market expectations. The focus of the central bank should be to increase the 
predictability of the market by raising the signal-to-noise ratio (by eliminating any 
guessing on the part of the public) to enable market participants to make more efficient 
decision (William Poole (2001: p.9) and Alan Blinder (1998: pp. 70-72)). The cases 
reviewed by Blinder et al (2010) show compelling evidence that the predictability of the 
interest rate decisions of the major central banks has improved remarkably in recent 
years— suggesting that financial markets’ expectations have become generally well 
aligned with actual decisions.  
Although the ECB was not given a quantitative objective by the Maastricht Treaty, 
it provided one for itself as an important part of its monetary policy strategy (Blinder et al 
2010) and is able to affect the evolution of market expectations. The ECB follows a price 
stability strategy (unlike other central banks e.g. bank of England that follow inflation 
targeting — IT strategy). Nonetheless, ECB releases (some aspects of) its inflation 
forecasts through the staff projections, published four times a year, supplemented by the 
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, which is published one week after each monetary policy meeting. 
                                                 
2 Agents’ expectation formation in (1) is facilitated by knowing the targets ty *  and t*  in the central 
bank’s policy rule: tr   = G ( ty – ty * , t , t* , …) + tv   
where t  is inflation and ty — ty *  denote the output gap, and π*, the central bank’s inflation target.  
 6 
The Bulletin provides an assessment of economic developments, including information on 
models, methods and indicators used. Besides, the ECB releases a press statement with the 
policy decision, but also holds a press conference on the day of Governing Council 
meetings, and responds to questions. For likely future policy decisions, ECB uses indirect 
signals: in the form of code words like “vigilance” (David-Jan Jansen and De Haan, 2007).  
 
3 Event Study Methodology 
Both the IMF (2009) and Ait-Sahalia et al (2010) have used event study methodology to 
analyze the response of the markets to policy initiatives announced by selected advanced 
economies. Event study methodology is well established, especially in the finance 
literature (e.g., Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay (1997). For the euro area, Ait-Sahalia et al 
(2010) include policy announcements by the European Central Bank (ECB) and national 
authorities from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain.  The dates of policy announcements are based on official press releases, major 
newspapers and news search engines. The data are double–checked against similar 
compilations of crisis events by central banks, investment banks, international 
organizations and individual researchers (for example, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(2009); Furceri and Mourougane (2009); Global Financial Association (2009); Guillén 
(2009).3 In all the studies, necessary care seems to have been taken in ensuring robustness 
of the results, including selection of event windows, timing of announcements, extracting 
the intention or objective behind a policy statement, etc.    
                                                 
3 Given a great diversity of the economic and financial press in the euro area, the authors identified watershed 
events using additional news sources such as Bloomberg and Associated Press, and the coverage in Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (2009).   
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The ECB announces its decisions at 1:45 pm, without any explanatory statements, 
and then explains the decisions in detail in the press conference 45 minutes later. Because 
of that delay, the market reaction to the release of the decision can be distinguished from 
the market reaction to the forward-looking announcements by using very high-frequency 
data. This way, you obtain results that are similar to those obtained with the principal 
components approach of Gürkaynak et al. (2005). Finally, it appears to me, the results are 
robust to controlling for the surprise content of announcements and using alternative 
measures of financial distress. However, what is reassuring about the findings of these 
studies (discussed in section 4) is their consistence (they reinforce each other). 
 
4 Discussion of empirical results  
 
4.1 Overview  
For countries where market responses to policy announcements during the recent financial 
crisis are analyzed, responses of the markets to specific crisis-related policy initiatives tend 
to be similar across countries (at least as far as direction of the response is concerned) 
though significant cross-country diversity do exist in the extent to which each market 
reacts to the same events, measured by Libor-OIS spreads.  Across countries, effects of 
policy announcements were greater during the global crisis than the subprime crisis and 
were most significant in the United States compared with the euro area, United Kingdom, 
Japan or any other developed economies.   
Evidence emerging from these assessments generally distinguishes between two 
categories of announcements: those that were effective in calming the distressed financial 
markets and those that increased stress in the financial markets. Interest rates cuts fall in 
the first category together with fiscal stimulus and recapitalization measures. In the second 
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category, includes announcements of decisions not to reduce interest rates and about ad 
hoc bank bailouts. 
4.2 Interest rate cuts 
Aït-Sahalia et al (2010) and IMF (2009) find that announcement of interest rates 
cuts decreased stress in the financial market during the financial crisis, evident by decline 
of the Libor–OIS spread in all the countries that were studied, including euro area. 
Announcements of interest rate cuts were found to be more effective in calming the 
distressed financial markets than announcements about liquidity support especially when 
the crisis worsened. In the euro area, interest rates were cut much more gradually during 
the subprime crisis and even during global crisis most likely over concerns about price 
stability and the functioning of the money market. In the midst of this, the euro area was 
found to have benefited from aggressive interest rate cuts by the United States during the 
subprime crisis and the United Kingdom during the global crisis – associated with decline 
in Libor-OIS spreads.  
4.3 Liquidity support 
Announcement of domestic currency liquidity support in the euro area during the 
global crisis were followed by significant reductions in interbank credit and liquidity risk, 
but to a less extent compared to interest rate cuts. In theory, if liquidity support is 
interpreted to signal underlying solvency problem, the impact can be negative. Evidence, 
however, confirm that the liquidity support that was announcement by central banks helped 
to reduce funding pressures particularly for institutions that depended on liquidity 
facilities. By this, it contributed to lowering of liquidity risk premia in the interbank 
markets.  
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Across countries, however, the IMF (2009) findings show the importance of 
liquidity support in the first period of the crisis; as the crisis worsened, the announcement 
of liquidity support measures no longer had a direct impact on interest rate spreads. This 
does not necessarily mean that liquidity measures were less effective, but rather that they 
might have been anticipated. 
4.4 Liability guarantees and recapitalization measures 
As expected, announcements of government guarantee scheme had larger impact 
on interbank risk premia than asset purchases had due to the ability of the scheme to 
transfer risks from banks’ balance sheets to the sovereign. Similarly, announcements of 
initiative to recapitalize the banks also yielded a favourable response in the interbank 
markets, with a substantial 20 basis point average reduction in the Libor–OIS spread over 
the event window during the global crisis (Aït-Sahalia et al 2010).  
When announcements to recapitalize the banks and to provide liability guarantees 
in the euro area were carefully considered, results show wider spreads (similar to the U.K) 
but were not statistically significant. This is probably is due to a limited integration of the 
crisis response, (as results demonstrate) with most recapitalization and liability guarantee 
measures targeted at selected national banks. Earlier, IMF (2009) had also found that 
announcements of liability guarantees reduced credit risk significantly in some cases (euro 
area and the United Kingdom), but not in the United States — which it attributes to the 
same fact that liability guarantees secure only a subset of creditors and not the bank as a 
whole. Table 2 shows that announcements of asset purchases or guarantees led to a 
statistically significant reduction in a country’s average bank CDS (composite index of the 
credit default swap) spread in three cases, the euro area, Switzerland, and the U.K.  
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It is important to note, however, that fiscal policy measures were not targeting 
reduction in interbank risk premia although they helped to reduce the Libor-OIS spreads, 
perhaps because the markets interpreted the initiative as evidence of political will to 
support ailing financial institutions. In fact, Aït-Sahalia et al (2010) provide evidence that 
announcements of fiscal stimulus packages by the euro area during the global financial 
crisis helped reduce the Libor-OIS spreads. Available studies indicate that the euro area 
governments announced fiscal stimulus measures later than other major economies like the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The reason is that they expected automatic 
stabilizer to play a more significant role during the crisis. But they also faced challenge of 
coordination and constraint imposed by the EU’s stability and Growth Pact.   
4.5 Decisions not to reduce interest rates 
Announcements by central banks to maintain or increase policy rates, on the other 
hand, attracted negative reaction of the markets – with average increase of about 25 basis 
points in the Libor–OIS spread over the event window. So were announcements of liability 
guarantee, and asset purchases which were followed by wider spreads between the Libor 
and OIS rates during the global crisis. This revelation is much similar to that of bank 
bailouts (that I shall turn to shortly), and is very much linked to problem of insufficient 
coordination. However, none of the policy announcements that were made attracted worse 
response from the markets than the ad hoc bank bailouts and bank failures, with the Libor–
OIS spreads widening by nearly 50 basis points on average over the event window. 
4.6 Bank bailouts and fiscal stimulus  
According to Aït-Sahalia et al (2010), although announcement of bank bailouts 
within the euro area were associated with rise in interbank credit and liquidity risk premia 
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— i.e. higher Libor – OIS spreads, the situation was less severe than it was in the United 
States. They also found that although announcements of fiscal stimulus during the 
subprime phase of the crisis did not result in significant reductions in the Libor-OIS spread 
for the euro, announcements of fiscal stimulus in the U.S. and announcements of liability 
guarantees and recapitalization in the United Kingdom during subprime crisis had 
significant impact in the euro area (Table 3, Appendix).  
However, domestic announcements of fiscal easing were associated with reductions 
in interbank credit and liquidity risk premia during the global phase of the crisis (Ait-
Sahalia et al 2010). There are suggestions that announcements concerning recapitalization 
were relatively ineffective in reducing the risk premia in interbank markets during the 
subprime crisis because they were meant to address shortfalls at the individual institutions. 
This changed during the global crisis when such announcements led to remarkable 
reductions in the Libor-OIS spreads in the United States and Japan. The impact of the 
recapitalization measures were less significant in the euro area, just like in the United 
Kingdom, among other countries perhaps owing to greater concerns about the rigor of 
stress tests used to determine banks’ capital needs in these economies as highlighted by   
Sahalia et al 2010). The euro area benefited from announcements of recapitalizations by 
the U.S. However, announcements of asset purchases were not helpful in reducing credit 
and liquidity risk premia, both in domestic and foreign markets. 
4.7 Spillover effects  
The spillovers from foreign announcements carry an important policy lesson. That, 
financial markets have become so much integrated that policy initiatives in response of a 
crisis taken by major economies are likely to have a bearing on market conditions in other 
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countries. Again, knowing that a decision of inaction (to raise or not to reduce interest rate) 
and announcements of ad hoc bailouts during a crisis of this nature can affect financial 
risks in other countries is itself very valuable for policy decision.  
Studies document intensification of international spillovers during the global phase 
of the financial crisis. During the subprime crisis, foreign policy initiatives hardly had any 
effects beyond national borders, but when decisions to bailout certain banks (especially in 
the U.S) and to maintain the policy rates were announced, it sent shock waves around the 
globe. Obviously, the interdependence of major systemic economies means that effects of 
monetary inaction and ad hoc or unsystematic rescue packages can go beyond national 
borders.   
 
5 Conclusions 
This essay reviews evidence on the impact of policy announcements on the financial 
markets in the euro area drawing on studies in this field. Based on the evidence, the 
following conclusions can be made.  Similarity in responses of the market to specific 
crisis-related policy initiatives. During a financial crisis of the nature experienced recently, 
measures to cut down interest rates and provide fiscal stimulus as well as recapitalization 
measures seem to be are appropriate options that are likely to calm the distressed financial 
markets as they were able reduce risk premia in the interbank markets in all the cases. Ad 
hoc bank bailouts as well as measures to increase or maintain interest rates constant are 
likely worsen the crisis as they happened to increase interbank risk premia in all the cases. 
Fiscal stimulus, if properly introduced, are likely to restore confidence in the financial 
system during a crisis and can alleviate the crisis. 
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 Finally, policy initiatives announced in one country has a significant bearing in 
another country (as demonstrated by their effects on credit and liquidity risk premia) with 
the effect increasing as the crisis intensified. This spillovers of policy announcements 
underscore the need for a coordinated policy response to restore market confidence during 
a global crisis. The results of the event study further illustrate that the short-term impact of 
interventions depended on the particular circumstances that prevailed during each phase of 
the crisis. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Table Classification of Events 
Central Bank—Monetary Policy and Liquidity Support 
Interest rate change Reduction of interest rates 
Liquidity support Reserve requirements, longer funding terms, more auctions and/or higher 
credit lines 
Domestic system lender of last resort: broader set of eligible institutions, wider 
collateral rules, and/or eligible collateral 
Other liquidity support (e.g., support of money market funds) 
Foreign exchange lender of last resort: forex swap lines (with other central 
banks) and forex repos 
Government—Financial Sector Stabilization Measures 
Recapitalization Capital injection (common stock/preferred equity) 
Capital injection (subordinated debt) 
Liability guarantees1 Enhancement of depositor protection 
Debt guarantee (all liabilities) 
Debt guarantee (new liabilities) 
Government lending to an individual institution 
Asset purchases2 Asset purchases (individual assets, bank by bank) 
Asset purchases (individual “bad bank”) 
Provisions of liquidity in context of bad asset purchases/removal 
On-balance-sheet “ring-fencing” with toxic assets kept in the bank 
Off-balance-sheet “ring-fencing” with toxic assets moved to a “bad bank” 
Asset guarantees  
 
Source: IMF staff estimates, reproduced from IMF (2009). 
1Includes the Federal Reserve’s liquidity support to AIG for toxic asset removal to a special-purpose vehicle, coupled with 
government’s loss sharing.  
2Includes business loan guarantees as part of financial sector stabilization measures (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany); for some 
countries, asset purchases were not conducted by the government, but (also) by the central bank (or a central bank-sponsored) 
agent, such as in the case of the United States and Switzerland.  
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Table 2. Effectiveness of Crisis Interventions 
 Monetary Policy  Financial Sector Policy  
 Interest rate cuts Liquidity support 
 
Recapitalization 
Liability 
guarantees 
Asset 
purchases 
 
Economic stress 
Index 
LIBOR-OIS 
spread 
 
Bank credit default swap spread  
   Event window (–1/+3 days)   
  Period 1: Pre-Lehman (06/01/07 to 09/14/08)  
Euro area – x  x x x 
Japan – –  – – – 
Sweden – x  x x – 
Switzerland – x  – – – 
United Kingdom x x  – x – 
United States x x  – x x 
  Period 2: Global Crisis 1 (09/15/08 to 12/31/08)  
Euro area x x  x x x 
Japan x x  x – – 
Sweden – x  – x – 
Switzerland x x  x x x 
United Kingdom x x  x – – 
United States x x  x x x 
  Period 3: Global Crisis 2 (01/01/09 to 06/30/09)  
Euro area x x  x x x 
Japan – x  x – – 
Sweden – x  – – – 
Switzerland x x  – – x 
United Kingdom x –  x – x 
United States x x  x x x 
 
Source: IMF staff estimates; reproduced from IMF (2009). 
Note: Shading denotes a statistically significant intervention at the 10 percent level. The statistical significance of the short-term 
impact of intervention announcements is tested as follows: (1) interest rate cuts on the economic stress index; (2) liquidity support 
on the three-month LIBOR-overnight index swap (OIS) spread; and (3-5) financial sector interventions on credit default swap 
spreads of local banks, weighted by the size of total assets. Only the front page policy announcements were considered. An 
unshaded “x” denotes statistically insignificant interventions and a “–“ implies  there were fewer than two front page policy events 
during the given subperiod. Statistical significance is attributed to policy measures only if both the parametric and the nonparametric 
tests concur. 
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Table 3. Effect of Foreign Policy Announcements on Libor–OIS Spreads  
  Subprime crisis  Global crisis 
  U.S.A U.K Euro area Japan  U.S.A U.K Euro area Japan 
Fiscal Policy — US US,UK US  JP EU JP US 
Interest rate cuts 0 0 0 0  UK,JP EU,JP JP EU,UK 
Quan./credit easing 0 — 0 0  0 0 UK,JP UK 
Domestic currency* 0 0 0 0  0   0 
Forex swap lines* EU 0 0 0  — — — — 
Recapitalisation 0 0 UK 0  EU US,JP US,UK US 
Asset purchases — 0 0 0  0 EU 0 EU 
Liquidity guaratees UK US UK US  0 US US 0 
Policy inaction  and 
bank bailouts 0 JP US,UK US 
 
EU US UK US 
 
Source: Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, Tamirisa (2010) 
Notes: * = Liquidity support. Table show statistically significant spillover effects of domestic policies on the corresponding 
country, based on bilateral country analyses — with column header country being the recipient of spillover originating from 
those in the cells. Italics mean increase in the Libor-OIS spreads due to spillovers and regular font a decrease; shaded 
indicate significant spillovers from all foreign announcements; dashed-line borders indicates increase in Libor-OIS spreads. 
“0” statistically insignificant spillovers; — means spillovers not feasible (foreign announcements did not occur or did not 
qualify as a front-page event).  
  
